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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Gross human rights violations -- such as forced displacement, forced labor,
genocide and torture -- have long made international headlines and been on the political
agenda of the international community. In a changing and globalized world, human
rights violations are no longer associated solely with governments, but also with
multinational corporations (“MNCs”). The Business and Human Rights Resource Center
-- widely acknowledged as providing the broadest array of “balanced information of
business and human rights”1 -- has documented abuses ranging from health and safety
violations in the workplace, to murder, torture, and forced displacement at the hands of
military and security forces protecting company facilities. Indeed, attention to corporate
human rights responsibility, the issue’s significance for contemporary business practice,
and the need for regulative outreach to non-state actors have increased tremendously.
Often the human rights performance of corporations and their host governments
overseas are intertwined and complicate the allocation of responsibility. The latest case
to feature extensively in international headlines, 2 that is emblematic of interdependencies
between states and corporation, concerns the oil operations of the France-based Total
S.A. (“Total”) in Myanmar (formerly Burma). The activities of Total in conjunction with
the U.S.-based Unocal Corp. (“Unocal”) in Burma resulted in prominent litigation against
the respective corporations in European and North-American jurisdictions. Major cases
against MNCs3 for human rights violations committed abroad have been brought in both
U.S courts under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute 4 (“ATS”) and European domestic courts. 5
∗

PhD Candidate, University of Trento, Italy; Research Associate, Northwestern University School of Law
Business & Human Rights Resource Center, A Brief Description, http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Aboutus/Briefdescription (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (quoting Mary Robinson, Director of
the Ethical Globalization Initiative, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and
President of Ireland). The Center tracks the human rights performance of over 3000 corporations in over
180 countries.
2
See As Myanmar Cracks Down on Protesters, Oil Companies Keep up Controversial Ties, INT ’L HERALD
TRIBUNE, Sept. 28, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/29/business/AS-FINMyanmar-Fueling-the-Junta.php; Global Firms Provide Lifeline to Myanmar's Junta, A GENCE FRANCE PRESS (AFP), Sept. 29, 2007, available at
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jono5w9ykIWMyXNPZgt4JiKLKDTg.
3
MNC for the purpose of this article is defined as the parent holding company as distinct from the local
subsidiary operating in the host state.
4
The ATS, passed by the Congress in 1789, confers on the district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. For a discussion on legal pluralism with regard to ATS litigation, see Luisa
Antoniolli, Taking Legal Pluralism Seriously: The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Role of International Law
1
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Like its joint venture partner Unocal, Total was alleged to have used forced labor
provided by the Burmese government to build a pipeline. The case against Total on
charges of complicity in crimes against humanity has just been reopened in Belgian
courts, after cases against Unocal in U.S. courts and against Total in French courts had
been settled on similar charges. 6 The case of Total shows that out-of-court settlements
will not protect MNCs in the long-run from liability; rather, corporations themselves,
NGOs with human rights agendas, academics, and policymakers must recognize and
address the significance of corporate human rights issues.
This article presents a case study on corporate human rights performance in the
extractive and manufacturing industries in various country contexts. The analysis
evolves around two main studies on Royal Dutch/Shell and Nike which shed light on the
dynamics underlying contemporary business practices in host countries and the sectorspecific patterns of human rights problems. In particular, the studies explore human
rights violations related to business activities in terms of the local political situation and
corporate structures of the parent-subsidiary relationship. Additional examples from the
respective industrial sector further illustrate: first, the various kinds of alleged human
rights violations; second, the corporation’s potential involvement in the abuses in the
context of the legal standards at stake; and finally, the implications of public scrutiny and
litigation for corporate policies. Thus, the article intends to give an account of liability
risks 7 for both the extractive and manufacturing sectors that is closely related to policy
parameters.
One reason for focusing on alleged abuses in the extractive and manufacturing
sectors is that these sectors have been the subject of intense public scrutiny and criticism
for their human rights performance abroad. Also, these industrial sectors illustrate
challenges of corporate human rights responsibility and implications for corporate
policies that are common and applicable to most other sectors. The analysis will show
before U.S. Federal Courts, 12 IND J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD . 651 (2005).
5
European jurisdictions provide for criminal prosecution rather than civil damages in order to redress
international human rights violations. Many European legal systems, however, do not allow for criminal
liability of legal entities, since it goes to the very heart of the controversy surrounding collective moral
responsibility. See Kai Ambos, Art. 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 475, 477-78 ¶ 4 (Otto Triffterer ed. 1999). It is argued
that a corporation, as any collective, has “no soul to damn” and “no body to kick,” and thus can be subject
neither to moral blame nor criminal liability. John Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 M ICH. L. RE V. 386 (1981). This
leads to a situation where corporations cannot be held criminally liable in domestic courts. However, there
are some exceptions. France and Belgium, for example, provide for corporate criminal responsibility and
thus allow the indictment and prosecution of legal persons and corporations in particular. See BRUNO
DEMEYERE , FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE , LAWS OF BELGIUM, ‘COMMERCE , CRIME AND CONFLICT : A
SURVEY OF SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 38 (Sept. 6, 2006), available at
www.fafo.no/liabilities/CCCSurveyBelgium06Sep2006.pdf; A BIGAIL HANSEN & W ILLIAM BOURDON,
FAFO AIS, SURVEY RESPONSE , LAWS OF FRANCE , ‘COMMERCE , CRIME AND CONFLICT : A SURVEY OF
SIXTEEN JURISDICTIONS’ 4-7 (Sept. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/CCCSurveyFrance06Sep2006.pdf.
6
Belgium Reopens Myanmar Humanity Crimes Probe Against Oil Giant Total, A GENCE FRANCE -PRESS
(AFP), Oct. 2, 2007 [hereinafter Belgium Reopens], available at
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g84fzhRA8Y6IvW-gmt7YmonfEBKg
7
This essay is confined to the analysis of the risk for MNCs to be held liable in courts of their home state,
i.e. where they are incorporated, under active nationality jurisdiction or in courts of a third state under
universal jurisdiction. It does not address the adjudication of abuses in courts of the host state, i.e. where
an MNC operates through its local subsidiaries.
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that corporations tend to shift from formally denying to acknowledging and assuming
responsibility for their impact on society.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN A BUSINESS CONTEXT : THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
¶5

¶6

This section analyzes human rights violations in the extractive sector by focusing
on the activities of Royal Dutch/Shell8 and its Nigerian subsidiary (“Shell”) 9 , the biggest
oil producer in Nigeria with a longstanding history of oil extraction in the Niger delta.
The main reason for focusing on Shell is that many of its oil facilities are close to local
communities that have continuously and increasingly protested the exploitation of their
land over the last decade. 10 In the face of protests, Shell has become more vulnerable to
accusations of complicity in human rights violations committed by government security
forces. Furthermore, the case of Shell in Nigeria shows a pattern of human rights
problems that is intrinsic to most oil and mining corporations.
The following sections describe human rights violations that occur in the midst of
business operations in the host country11 and elaborate on the common parameters of
liability risks in the extractive industries.
A. Complicity Charges: the Case of Shell in Nigeria

¶7

Shell is peculiar compared to other oil corporations: rather than relying on support
from its home government, it cooperates closely with host governments to initiate and
maintain its oil operations abroad. 12 Given these close relationships, Shell was
particularly vulnerable to charges of complicity in state human rights abuses against local
communities in the oil areas -- especially against the Ogoni people.
1. Corporate Structures in the Local Political Context

¶8

When facing allegations of human rights violations, Shell, like many other oil
companies, often points to the difficult political and social environment in which it
conducts its oil operations. 13 In 1999, Shell -- while acknowledging that human rights
problems surrounded its oil operations in Nigeria -- stressed that “major human rights
violations do not generally exist in a vacuum, but within a nexus of corruption, poverty,
poor public services and infrastructure, governmental instability and other factors which
make it difficult for business to operate.”14 Thus, the boundaries between the local
8

Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company.
Unless specified otherwise, Royal Dutch/Shell and its Nigerian Subsidiary are henceforth referred to as
“Shell.”
10
See HUM. RTS. W ATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES 12 (1999) [hereinafter THE PRICE OF OIL],
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria0199.pdf.
11
Evidence is established through corporate statements regarding human rights-related incidents,
substantial claims from non-governmental organizations, civil society and the international press, as well as
findings in related court proceedings primarily brought before U.S. courts.
12
See J. George Frynas, Global Monitor: Royal Dutch/Shell, 8 NEW POL. ECON. 275, 279-80 (2003).
13
See Richard Boele et al., Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. A Study in Unsustainable Development: I. The
Story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni People - Environment, Economy, Relationships: Conflict and
Prospects for Resolution, 9 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 74, 82 (2001).
14
Boele, supra note 13, at 82 (quoting SHELL INTERNATIONAL , M ANAGEMENT PRIMER ON HUMAN RIGHTS
9
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political context in which human rights violations occur and a corporation’s intrinsic
sphere of influence and responsibility are often blurred.
¶9
Indeed, the environment in which MNCs operate is often characterized by deep
frictions among opposing local factions, usually the official government and local
communities. 15 Such tense situations in the host country make it difficult to draw the line
between governmental and corporate responsibility for human rights violations. 16
¶10
A closer look at the corporate structures of oil companies and their relationship
with host governments is necessary to define the scope of corporate human rights
responsibility. In many oil extracting countries, the oil industry is nationalized; as a
result, oil corporations often operate in a joint venture with the host government. For
example, Royal Dutch/Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary, the Shell Petroleum Development
Company (SPDC), is a minority shareholder in a joint venture with the Nigerian National
Petroleum Company; Shell serves as the operating partner in the joint venture making all
operational decisions. 17 Thus, corporate and governmental interests in the protection of
oil facilities and oil production are largely intertwined. This interdependence provides
the basis for complicity charges against MNCs, as well as calls by communities and
NGOs for oil corporations to use their joint venture influence to promote greater respect
for human rights in governmental policies. 18
2. Setting the Scene: Security on the Ground
¶11

Complicity charges against MNCs must be evaluated in light of the security risks in
the host country. Security issues are one of the most urgent problems facing oil
corporations in many of their operating countries. According to Human Rights Watch
(“HRW”), sabotage of pipeline projects, intimidation of company and contractor staff,
and hostage-taking do occur, even though companies and local communities dispute the
prevalence of these incidents, particularly sabotage. 19
¶12
These security risks are rooted in protests against corporate policies that often have
detrimental effects on local communities. In Nigeria, for instance, the Ogoni people
allege that Shell Nigeria coercively appropriated land for oil production without adequate
compensation and caused environmental degradation. 20 The unequal distribution of gains
for Shell and losses for local communities has sparked protests that result in security risks
to the oil corporation.
¶13
In order to protect their staff and facilities, oil corporations hire so-called
“supernumerary police,” trained and recruited by the Nigerian police. Additionally,
corporations may enlist Nigerian government security forces, such as the Mobile Police. 21
(1999)).
15
See THE PRICE OF OIL, supra note 10, at 68-71.
16
See Watts, supra note 22, at 390.
17
See Boele, supra note 13, at 75; J. Paul Martin, Royal Dutch Shell: How Deep the Changes, in NONSTATE A CTORS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS UNIVERSE , 93, 95 (George Andreopoulos et al. eds., 2006).
18
See THE PRICE OF OIL, supra note 10, at 3-6.
19
Id. at 3, 10.
20
See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293 at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2002); Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal at
6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006), leave for
interlocutory appeal granted, Nos. 06-4800 & -4876 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2006).
21
See THE PRICE OF OIL, supra note 10, at 10, 14.
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Furthermore, the Nigerian government has set up special Task Forces to handle security
issues in the oil production areas, such as the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force
that was created to respond to the Ogoni crisis. Because these multiple relationships
create several lines along which human rights abuses can occur, each incident needs to be
examined individually in order to allocate responsibility for the abuses.
3. The Range of Liability Risks
¶14

Human rights violations are most commonly committed by government security
forces in response to protests against oil operations. 22 Major MNCs, such as Shell and
Chevron Corporation (“Chevron”), have been accused of complicity in crimes against
humanity, summary execution, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture, cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment, and other violations of international law, such as
infringements on the right to life, liberty and security of the person, and the right to
peaceful assembly and association. 23
¶15
Complicity charges were brought against Royal Dutch/Shell and its Nigerian
subsidiary SPDC in U.S. courts under the ATS and the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA) in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 24 and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. 25
Like the Wiwa plaintiffs, the Kiobel plaintiffs claimed that they and their kin were
subjected to human rights violations by the Nigerian government, violations in which the
corporate defendants were complicit. 26 The allegations against Royal Dutch/Shell and its
Nigerian subsidiary are substantially similar in both cases and hinge upon two sets of
incidents. 27 The first set involved violations against local residents by Nigerian military
police/security forces allegedly requested by Shell Nigeria in order to protect company
facilities and contain protests. Specifically, Wiwa and Kiobel plaintiffs claimed that the
security forces beat and shot locals protesting the destruction of their property for
pipeline construction purposes in April 1993, and shot three people, killing one of them,
in October 1993 near a Shell flow station at Korokoro, Rivers State, Nigeria. 28 The
plaintiffs alleged that the military police used vehicles supplied by Royal Dutch/Shell and
that corporate staff were present during the assaults. 29
¶16
The second set of incidents involved the arbitrary detention, trial and ultimate
execution in 1995 of the “Ogoni 9,” including Ken Saro-Wiwa and Barinem Kiobel, all
leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MSOP). 30 After eight
22

See Michael J. Watts, Righteous Oil? Human Rights, The Oil Complex, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 30 A NN. REV. OF ENV’T AND RESOURCES 373, 390-91 (2005).
23
See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2000); Eighth Amended Complaint
for Damages and Equitable Relief at 26-42, Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 1999 U.S. Dist.
Ct. Pleadings 5760 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006).
24
Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293.
25
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2006), leave for interlocutory
appeal granted, Nos. 06-4800 & -4876 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2006).
26
Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 92; Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, supra note 20, at 1.
27
See id. at 1-2; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 02 Civ. 7618, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71421, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006).
28
Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, supra note 20, at 6-7; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386
& 01 Civ. 1909, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65601, at*3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2006).
29
See Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, supra note 20, at 6-7; Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *5.
30
MOSOP is the representative organization of the Ogoni people and forms an opposition against Shell’s
operations in the region. See Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at **4-5; Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, supra
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months of detention without being charged, Ken Saro-Wiwa (president of the MSOP) and
other leaders of the protest movement were put on trial before a special court under
“formal” charges of murder. 31 Owens Wiwa -- son of Ken Saro-Wiwa -- was subject to
multiple unlawful detentions from December 1993 until April 1994, and was allegedly
assaulted and tortured repeatedly during his detentions. 32
The plaintiffs in Wiwa and Kiobel alleged that Royal Dutch/Shell -- operating
directly and through its Nigerian subsidiary -- cooperated and even conspired with
Nigerian authorities in order to contain the protest movement and secure its oil operations
in the Niger Delta. 33 The plaintiffs claimed that the trial failed to satisfy international
standards of due process because there was no possibility for appeal and witnesses were
bribed by the defendants to give false testimony. 34 The plaintiffs further alleged that the
defendants offered Ken Saro-Wiwa his freedom in exchange for an end to the MSOP’s
international protests against Shell. 35
On February 22, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Wiwa denied most of the defendant’s motions to dismiss and held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to file their actions under the ATS and the TVPA. 36 In September
2006, the court in Kiobel granted the motions to dismiss with regard to extrajudicial
killings, forced exile, destruction of property, and right to life, liberty and personal
assembly. 37 However, the court preserved the general claim of aiding and abetting under
the ATS and the particular claims concerning crimes against humanity and torture, as
well as arbitrary arrest and detention. 38 The court certified all issues for interlocutory
appeal. 39
The claims against Royal Dutch/Shell reveal a broad range of human rights
problems facing MNCs. Whereas the first set of incidents involves abuses committed by
security forces that are either contracted, requested by, or otherwise acting with the
awareness of the corporation, the second set of cases pertains to more general allegations
of corporate support of repressive policies in the host country.
The distinction between these types of human rights problems correspond to the
categories of beneficial and so-called silent complicity. The Global Compact identifies
three categories of corporate complicity -- direct complicity, beneficial complicity and
silent complicity. 40 On one end of the spectrum is direct complicity, and on the other is
silent complicity, mere presence in a country with repressive policies. Beneficial
complicity lies somewhere in between. 41
note 20, at 7-8.
31
Wiwa, 226 F.3d 88 at 92; Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, supra note 20, at 7.
32
Id. at 9.
33
Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293 at *5; Kiobel, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71421 at *2.
34
Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, supra note 20, at 8.
35
Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *5.
36
Id. at *2.
37
Kiobel, 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 468. (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2006), leave for interlocutory appeal granted, Nos.
06-4800 & -4876 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2006).
38
Id. at 463-67.
39
See id. at 467-68.
40
Celia Wells & Juanita Elias, Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the
International Stage, in NON-STATE A CTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 141, 163 (Philip Alston ed. 2005).
41
See Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon: An Examination of Forced
Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT ’L L. 91,
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¶21

Direct complicity exists where a corporation knowingly assists violations of
international law committed by a state; to date, direct complicity has only been found in a
limited number of cases. 42 So-called “silent complicity” refers to non-action, for
example, the silence of a corporation in the face of systematic or continuous human rights
violations by host country authorities. Under this concept, silence is deemed not to be
neutral; 43 rather, the company is expected to “raise systematic and continuous human
rights abuses with the appropriate authorities.”44 For example, corporations were accused
of “silent complicity” for investing and operating in apartheid South Africa, since their
business activities arguably helped to perpetuate a regime of discrimination and racism. 45
Thus, a multitude of corporations were sued under the ATS in U.S Courts. 46 The
plaintiffs claimed that the corporation’s mere business activity in apartheid South Africa
constituted a violation of the law of nations and thus created a cause of action under the
ATS. 47 The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that it “must be
extremely cautious in permitting suits here based upon a corporation's doing business in
countries with less than stellar human rights records”48 and thus decided that a
corporation’s business activities alone are not sufficient to provide a basis for ATS
jurisdiction. 49 In October 2007, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the District
Court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' ATS claims and remanded for further proceedings. 50
¶22
Beneficial complicity, also referred to as indirect complicity, 51 is more difficult to
conceptualize since it lies at the edge of accountability and liability. 52 It pertains to
situations where there is no direct corporate involvement in the execution of human rights
violations by a third party, but the violations occur in the context of business activities
and the corporation benefits from the violations. 53 The most common example of
beneficial complicity is the situation where security forces use repressive measures when
protecting company facilities or containing peaceful protests. 54 The major lawsuit against
103 (2002).
42
Examples of direct complicity are German corporations, in particular I. G. Farben, Flick and Krupp, that
used forced labor during World War II. See Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 102. Inés Tófalo applies a
different metric in these cases of direct complicity by showing that the human rights violations are
“symbiotic joint actions, where the state and the TNC [transnational corporation] act in concert.” Inés
Tófalo, Overt and Hidden Accomplices: Transnational Corporations' Range of Complicity for Human
Rights Violations, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 335, 339 (Olivier de Schutter
ed. 2006).
43
Wells, supra note 39, at 173; Klaus Leisinger, Business and Human Rights, in EMBEDDING HUMAN
RIGHTS IN BUSINESS PRACTICE 50, 56 (UN Global Compact Office ed. 2004).
44
A NDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE A CTORS 221 (2006) (quoting Report
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 56th Session of the General Assembly, at
¶ 111, U.N. Doc. A/56/36/2001 (2001)).
45
Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 103.
46
See Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
47
See Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
48
Id. at 554.
49
Id. at 557.
50
See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s dismissal of the ATS
claims holding that the District Court erred when it held that the ATS does not allow for claims of aiding
and abetting liability. See id. at 260.
51
See Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 102.
52
See Tófalo, supra note 41, at 340-44, 350-51; Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 102.
53
See Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 102-03.
54
See United Nations Global Compact, The Ten Principles: Principle Two, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/Principle2.html.
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Unocal in U.S. courts involves allegations of beneficial complicity in the human rights
violations committed by the government in the furtherance of an oil pipeline project. 55
4. Complicity Standards under the Ninth Circuit Ruling
¶23

Complicity standards were first defined with respect to corporate liability under the
ATS by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Doe v. Unocal.56 Relying
heavily on standards developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the court
held that complicity requires “knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime”57 ; under this reasonable knowledge
test, a plaintiff must show that the corporation “knew or had reason to know” that its
actions assisted the crime. 58 This mens rea requirement creates an important nexus
between the action of the direct perpetrator and the corporation.
¶24
A broad array of indicators may establish this nexus, including the fact that a
corporation derives economic benefits from the violations; in such cases, the complicity
is often referred to as “beneficial/beneficiary complicity.”59 Other indicators may include
the nature of the business relation, i.e. the level of corporate control in a private-public
joint venture, the continuation of corporate assistance despite awareness of the violations,
and the presence of a common goal. 60 Neither scholars nor courts have settled yet which
indicators establish the required nexus. 61 Ralph Steinhardt, a prominent scholar in the
field, points to the difficulty to “handle the intermediate case where a corporation simply
benefits [from abuses], without contractual nexus,” i.e. the corporation is not connected
with the government by contract regarding joint venture projects or provision of security
services. 62
¶25
The Unocal court also had to define the actus reus requirement to establish
complicity. Granting Unocal’s motion for summary judgment in 2000, the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California argued that Unocal’s conduct did not satisfy
the standard of “active participation” in using forced labor, as the corporation merely
knowingly accepted the benefits of forced labor utilized in furtherance of a joint pipeline
project with the government. 63 Following the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the Court of
55

See Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 102. The categorization of the different complicity cases is often
difficult and differs among academic scholars. Thus, for example, Tófalo considers the state commission
of abuses in furtherance of a joint venture as a case of direct, rather than indirect complicity. Tófalo, supra
note 41, at 340-41.
56
Even though the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to rehear the case en banc, the case was finally
vacated due to an out-of-court settlement by the parties. Thus, the ruling does not stand any longer;
however, the court’s elaborations with regard to the requirements of corporate complicity are often referred
to. See CLAPHAM, supra note 43, at 255.
57
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2002).
58
Id. at 951 (quoting Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 180 (Jan.
27, 2000)).
59
See Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 102, 145; see also CLAPHAM, supra note 43, at 221-22, 257.
60
See Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 102-03; Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility and the
International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria, in NON-STATE A CTORS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 177, 199-200.
61
See id. at 198-202; Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 102-03.
62
Steinhardt, supra note 59, at 200.
63
See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947-48; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000). See
also Andrew Clapham, The Complexity of International Criminal Law: Looking Beyond Individual
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Appeals rejected this view and held that the act of assistance does not have to actually
cause the violations of the principal, here the host government. 64 Rather, the court
deemed it sufficient that the acts of the accomplice have a “[substantial] effect on the
commission of the crime,” such that the abuses would “most probably” not have occurred
“in the same way” without the participation of the corporation. 65
5. Agency and Joint Action Liability
¶26

To establish third-party liability for corporate human rights abuses under the ATS,
U.S. courts have preferred the theory of aiding and abetting under international law, as
seen in the court’s decision in Unocal. 66
¶27
However, imputation may also be established under federal common law rules,
such as joint venture liability, agency liability and reckless disregard. 67 In Wiwa, the
court agreed with the plaintiffs that Royal Dutch/Shell “dominated and controlled” Shell
Nigeria and thus principles of agency liability applied. 68 Under agency law, the
corporation, as the principal, is liable for the acts of the agent and cannot put forward as a
defense that the agent was merely authorized to perform lawful, non-tortious acts. 69
Accordingly, the plaintiffs claimed that the existence of an agency relationship between
Royal Dutch/Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary rendered Shell responsible for the “willful
participa[tion]” of its Nigerian subsidiary in “joint action” with Nigerian government that
violated the plaintiffs’ rights. 70 However, the court found that there was no need to
employ this theory of imputation since the plaintiffs presented sufficient facts to support
an immediate “significant cooperative action” between Royal Dutch/Shell and the
Nigerian government in committing the abuses at issue. 71

Responsibility to the Responsibility of Organizations, Corporations and States, in FROM SOVEREIGN
IMPUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL A CCOUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN A W ORLD OF STATES 233,
242 (Ramesh Thakur & Peter Malcontent eds., 2004).
64
See Tófalo, supra note 41, at 343-44; CLAPHAM , supra note 43, at 257.
65
Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion & Judgment ¶ 688
(May 7, 1997)).
66
See Tarekt F. Maassarani, Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice
Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT ’L L. & POL. 39, 39 (2005); Unocal, 395 F.3d at
946-51.
67
Reference to these principles for third-party liability is made particularly when federal common law
rather than international law is deemed the appropriate source of law in these cases. See id. at 964-69.
However, as Judge Reinhardt in his concurring opinion in Unocal points out, joint liability and agency
principles are well established under international law as well. Id. at 972-73.
68
Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *41 n.14.
69
Tófalo, supra note 41, at 342.
70
Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at **40-41. Corporate human rights liability generally requires a
sufficient nexus to state action (Exceptions were recognized by U.S. courts for slave trading, genocide, war
crimes, and forced labor. See CLAPHAM , supra note 43, at 255). In Wiwa, the plaintiffs employed the “joint
action” test to establish Shell Nigeria’s involvement in the government abuses. Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3293, at *40. Under the “joint action” test, private actors are considered state actors provided that
they are "willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents." Id.
71
Id. at **41-43. The court stressed that it is merely deciding upon a motion to dismiss; thus, the evidence
presented by the plaintiffs is not analyzed with the same rigor as with regard to a motion for summary
judgment. Id. at **45-46.
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6. The Corporate Actus Reus
¶28

Corporate acts that consitute an actus reus and trigger complicity liability may take
on various forms. Often human rights violations are preceded by a corporation’s request
for security protection by government forces. In Wiwa, for example, the plaintiffs
claimed that Royal Dutch/Shell directly, or through its local subsidiary, “recruited the
Nigerian police and military to suppress MSOP” and ensure that oil “development
activities could proceed ‘as usual.’”72 The plaintiffs further alleged that Royal
Dutch/Shell made payments to the military, provided logistical support (such as
transportation and weapons), 73 and participated in the overall planning and coordination
of the “security operations” by attending regular meetings with the security forces. 74
¶29
Wiwa is not the only case concerning abuses by security forces. In an incident at
Umuechem in 1990, Shell was also accused of being complicit in the “killing of eighty
unarmed civilians and the destruction of hund reds of homes” by security forces whose
protection Shell had explicitly requested. 75
¶30
Corporations often contest their alleged connection to public security forces 76
which is difficult to reconstruct since the criminal acts do not occur in a corporation’s
inner “sphere of influence.”77 Shell acknowledged direct payment to Nigerian security
forces on at least one occasion. 78 However, it strongly denied inferences that a security
arrangement involving possible payment to the Special Task Force in the Ogoni region
existed, even though the Guardian reported in 1995 about a Nigerian government
document implying an arrangement of such kind. 79 While Royal Dutch/Shell
increasingly acknowledges its responsibility for human rights violations by security
forces, 80 its local subsidiaries have been more reluctant to accept such responsibility. 81
72

Id. at *5.
Id.
74
Brief of Wiwa Plaintiffs, supra note 20, at 9-10.
75
THE PRICE OF OIL, supra note 10, at 14.
76
See Frynas, supra note 12, at 282.
77
Principle One of the Global Compact states that “businesses should support and respect the protection of
international human rights within their sphere of influence.” United Nations Global Compact, The Ten
Principles: Principle One [hereinafter Principle One], available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle1.html. The Global Compact
principles do not elaborate in more detail what is considered to be the corporate “sphere of influence.” Id.
However on its official webpage the Global Compact provides indications on how the sphere of influence
should be mapped. Precisely, the “sphere of influence” involves the inner sphere of corporate human rights
compliance “in the workplace” and the outer sphere of human rights commitment “in the community.” Id.
Furthermore, the corporate “sphere of influence” extends to the situation when corporations rely on security
forces for the protection of their company facilities and these security forces violate international standards
for the use of force. Id. When moving from a corporation’s inner to its outer sphere of influence a decrease
in legal density of corporate human rights duties can be observed. See CLAPHAM, supra note 43, at 220.
Accordingly, this gradual conception of the sphere of corporate influence can be aligned to the three
dimensions of human rights obligations, namely the obligation to respect human rights (in the workplace),
the duty to protect human rights (for example by preventing the use of force by external security forces),
the duty to promote human rights (by contributing to the human rights debate in the wider community). Id.
78
THE PRICE OF OIL, supra note 10, at 13.
79
See Boele, supra note 13, at 80.
80
This is reflected for example in the endorsement of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights by many major corporations from the extractive sector, where the latter subscribe themselves to best
practices regarding their relationship with private and public security forces. See Int’l Bus. Leaders Forum
& Bus. Soc. Responsibility, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).
73
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Still, even Shell Nigeria admits to “the gap between its intentions and its current
performance.”82 Though quite tentative, this statement reflects rising awareness of the
human rights problems.
¶31
Cases in which subcontracted security forces commit excessive acts may involve
indirect corporate complicity. However, where corporate staff are present when military
forces commit abuses -- as was alleged of Shell -- and take no steps to prevent the abuses
from occurring, the nexus between corporate acts and human rights abuses is even closer
and implicates direct complicity. 83
¶32
In this context, legal responsibilities are difficult to allocate because the effects of
the corporate acts are often not immediate, but rather intermediated by political dynamics
in the host country. For instance, Shell once called for the intervention of the naval
forces, whose subsequent deployment of the Mobile Police led to the assault of numerous
local community members. 84 In such instances, corporations often defend themselves by
referring to their mere legal obligation to inform Nigerian authorities when a threat to oil
production exists. 85
¶33
Furthermore, determining either the nature or degree of private-public involvement
and cooperation is not an easy task; defining in clear terms the realm of corporate
responsibilities stemming from this relationship is even more complex. Certainly, oil
corporations tend to operate in difficult political and social environments. Nonetheless,
the economic interest in oil production -- on the part of both corporations and host
governments -- has exacerbated frictions with local communities in the oil producing
areas, deepened discontent in the delta, and might have often lead to repressive
government responses. 86 This undeniable link should be taken into consideration when
determining the responsibility of MNCs for human rights abuses.
7. The Extraterritorial Reach of Jurisdiction
¶34

Wiwa holds MNCs liable for human rights abuses occur ring in the context of their
business activities abroad. The liability risk for MNCs is particularly significant since
U.S. courts assert personal jurisdiction over business entities incorporated under the
sitting jurisdiction, as well as over non-resident units of MNCs where an affiliate is
present in U.S. jurisdiction and has a “sufficient” relationship with the non-resident unit.87
Precisely, the relationship must be of such a nature that “two [entities] can be regarded as
a single unit for the service or process.”88 To determine whether a sufficient relationship
exists, courts consider various factors, including ownership, control, and the (even
temporary) presence of corporate officials of the non-resident entity on U.S. territory. 89
¶35
Under these standards, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals asserted personal
jurisdiction over the two holding companies: Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
81

Frynas, supra note 12, at 282.
Boele, supra note 13, at 84 (referencing SPDC (Shell Nigeria) as of 1998).
83
See THE PRICE OF OIL, supra note 10, at 14; Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 102.
84
See THE PRICE OF OIL, supra note 10, at 15.
85
See id. at 4, 152.
86
See THE PRICE OF OIL, supra note 10, at 17.
87
PETER T. M UCHLINSKI, M ULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES A ND THE LAW 141 (2007).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 148-49.
82
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(incorporated in the Netherlands) and Shell Transport and Trading Co. (incorporated in
the UK). 90 The court found that an Investor Relations Office in New York was
“facilitating the relations of the parent holding companies with the investment
community.”91 Thus, a sufficient relationship between the affiliate and non-resident units
was established even though the Investors Relations Office was “nominally part of Shell
Oil Company” -- whose shares are all held by the independent U.S subsidiary92 -- and not
of the parent holdings. 93
8. Shell’s Response: A Changed Human Rights Approach
¶36

In the face of public scrutiny of its operations, particularly in Nigeria, Shell adopted
a stakeholder-sensitive corporate policy that holds itself responsible for an inner sphere of
employee rights and an outer sphere of community rights and security policies. 94 Thus,
Shell incorporated a model of corporate human rights responsibilities in its management
agenda that follows the policy guidelines of the Global Compact. 95 Generally,
corporations in the extractive and energy sector have become increasingly aware of the
human rights problems surrounding security arrangements. Thus, many corporations
which were subject to public scrutiny, including Shell, Chevron, Rio Tinto and
AngloGold Ashanti, participated in a multi-stakeholder dialogue with various
governments and NGOs that resulted in the adoption of the Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights. 96 These Principles set out best practices for extractive
corporations in forming their relationships with public and private security forces. 97
¶37
But the difficulty in assigning “relevant performance measures (metrics) that can be
verified,” as pointed out by Shell, accentuates the practical problems that MNCs face in
carrying out their responsibilities outside the workplace, and needs further analysis as
well as better legal standards and guidelines. 98
B. Human Rights Problems in the Extractive Industries: A Widespread and Multifaceted Issue
¶38

Human rights problems are not peculiar to Shell in Nigeria. A multitude of
corporations in the extractive industries face similar problems in various country
contexts. In order to illustrate the patterns elaborated above, the following section
outlines further human rights abuses that have occurred in the context of extractive
operations and have drawn public scrutiny.
90

Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 94-95. The two holding companies “jointly control and operate the Royal Dutch/Shell
Group, a vast, international, . . . network of affiliated but formally independent oil and gas companies.” Id.
at 92.
91
Id. at 93.
92
All shares of the Shell Oil Company are held by Shell Petroleum Inc., the U.S. subsidiary company of the
parent holding companies. Id. at 93.
93
Id. at 93, 96-98.
94
SHELL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (SI), THE SHELL REPORT : PEOPLE , PLANET AND PROFITS: A N A CT OF
COMMITMENT 29 (1999).
95
Principle One, supra note 76.
96
See Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, supra note 79.
97
See Martin, supra note 16, at 105.
98
SHELL INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (SI), supra note 93, at 29. See also Martin, supra note 16, at 107-09
(expressing criticism about Shell’s human rights agenda).

338

Vol. 6:2]

Caroline Kaeb
1. Killings, Arbitrary Detention, Torture in Nigeria

Claims were brought against the U.S.-based ChevronTexaco Corporation99
("Chevron”) in Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., alleging liability for “their own acts
and the acts of CNL” (Chevron Nigeria Limited) in two incidents that occurred in the
Nigerian Delta region. 100 The first took place in May 1998 and resulted in the shooting of
protesters at Chevron’s Parabe offshore platform and the subsequent detention and torture
of the protest leader. 101 The protesters were residents of the Niger Delta demanding a
larger contribution from Chevron toward the development of the oil extracting area. 102
The plaintiffs claimed that CNL acted “in concert with" Chevron when it recruited
Nigerian government forces to intervene and transported their soldiers in CNL- leased
helicopters. 103 Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that CNL personnel were on board the
helicopters. 104 CNL confirmed that a CNL employee was in one helicopter for
observatory purposes, but lacked control over the Nigerian military action. 105 The second
incident, as described by the plaintiffs, occurred in January 1999; soldiers in a CNLleased helicopter opened fire on two villages, Opia and Ikenyan, injuring and killing
several people. 106 The soldiers were allegedly paid by CNL the day after the attacks. 107
Chevron’ s spokesman Charles Stewart acknowledged the payment to the soldiers, but
stressed that the money was merely part of regular payments to Nigerian soldiers for
protecting its facilities. 108
¶40
On March 22, 2004, the District Court for the Northern District of California
denied Chevron’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs presented
evidence of an "extraordinarily close relationship between the parents and subsidiaries
prior to, during and after the attacks."109 Moreover, the court found that the relationship
could be sufficient for a reasonable jury to qualify the local subsidiary as an agent of
Chevron, for whose actions the latter can be held liable. 110 Factors supporting an agency
relationship included the high volume of communications between the defendant and its
¶39

99

The corporation operated under the name “ChevronTexaco” since its merger with Texaco in 2001 until
2005 when it changed its name back to “Chevron.”
100
Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 2004). From 2000 until late
2006, Chevron filed a series of motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment directed both at the
entire case and at specific claims.
101
See id.
102
See THE PRICE OF OIL, supra note 10, at 3,11.
103
Bowoto, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1233; see also Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59374, at **4-5 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
104
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., Order re: Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Pls.’ Claims 10 Through 17, No. C 99-02506
SI, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Cal. August 14, 2007).
105
See id.
106
Bowoto, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
107
See Marcos Simmons, Chevron to Stand Trial for Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria: Federal Judge
Finds Evidence that Chevron was Complicit in Murder of Nigerian Villagers, EARTHRIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL , Aug. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/chevron_to_stand_trial_for_human_rights_abuses_in_nigeria.html.
108
David R. Baker, Chevron Paid Nigerian Troops after Alleged Killings: Villagers in Lawsuit Say 4
People Died - Oil Company Questions If Attacks Took Place, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/08/04/MNGAJE2I2K1.DTL.
109
Bowoto, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
110
Id. at 1246.
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local subsidiary on the days of the security incidents, close parent-subsidiary monitoring,
integral company policies, and overlap in management staff. 111
¶41
Finally on August 14, 2007, the court issued a series of orders denying other
motions by Chevron for summary judgment. 112 Accordingly, since the plaintiffs had
established enough evidence that “CNL personnel were directly involved in the attacks,
that CNLhad paid and transported the GSF [Nigerian government security forces], and
that CNL knew that GSF were prone to use excessive force,”113 the case went to trial.
2. Murder, Rape and Torture in Furtherance of Forced Labor in Burma
¶42

One of the most prominent corporate human rights cases to-date was settled in
California state and federal courts. The case concerned charges against Unocal114 for
complicity in human rights violations in relation to the Yadana pipeline project in Burma
(today Myanmar) in the 1990s. The pipeline project was a joint-venture between the
U.S.-based Unocal, the state-run Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, Thailand's major oil
exploration firm PTTEP, and the French corporation Total. 115 Unocal was allegedly
complicit in the murder, rape, and torture of local residents by the Burmese Military,
which Unocal had contracted to provide security services to the pipeline project. The
plaintiffs claimed that the abuses were committed in furtherance of forced labor for the
construction of the pipeline. 116
¶43
Though ultimately vacated and settled out-of-court, 117 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in reversing the District Court’s summary judgment on the major ATS claims, 118
held that “the evidence . . . supports the conclusion that Unocal gave practical assistance
to the Burmese Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to forced labor.”119 According to the
court, the practical assistance “took the form of hiring the Burmese Military to provide
security and build infrastructure along the pipeline route” and giving logistical
information to the military about where to provide security in daily meetings. 120 Given
the District Court’s finding that Unocal knew that forced labor was used, 121 the Ninth
Circuit further held that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Unocal “knew or
should reasonably have known” that its payment and provision of logistical information
would “assist or encourage the Myanmar Military to subject Plaintiffs to forced
labour.”122 In response to allegations of complicity in forced labor, a Unocal spokesman
said that the company acknowledged that human rights abuses may have taken place in
111

See id. at 1241-46.
The motion regarding plaintiffs’ claims under the ATS was granted merely as to the charges of crimes
against humanity. Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59374 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
113
Simmons, supra note 107.
114
Unocal was acquired by Chevron in 2005.
115
Global Firms Provide Lifeline to Myanmar's Junta, supra note 2.
116
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002).
117
CLAPHAM , supra note 43, at 255.
118
Unocal, 395 F.3d at 937; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
119
Unocal, 395 F.3d at 952.
120
Id.
121
Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.
122
Unocal, 395 F.3d at 953.
112
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Burma, but that Unocal operated under high ethical standards and rejected allegations of
complicity with the military as unsubstantiated. 123
¶44
Similar charges against another partner in the Yadana joint venture pipeline project,
the French corporation Total, were filed in French and Belgian courts. 124 The victims
claimed that Total also provided logistical and financial support to the military, which
had coerced locals into labor for the construction of the pipeline. 125
¶45
Although French courts only exercise home state jurisdiction, 126 Belgian courts, like
those of the U.S., exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over suspects of foreign nationality
for international crimes committed abroad. 127 The French Total case was ultimately
settled, 128 but in Belgium, criminal proceedings initiated in 2002 by four Myanmar
refugees 129 have just been reopened after the Belgian Constitutional Court held that a
person recognized as a refugee in Belgium enjoys the same rights as a Belgian citizen. 130
Thus, the provisions of the Belgian Criminal Code prescribing criminal jurisdiction over
crimes -- especially international crimes 131 -- committed abroad allowed further
investigation and prosecution of the case against Total. 132
¶46
According to the leading/largest French news agency, Total’s only comment
regarding the reopening of the Belgian case has been that the corporation has “taken
note” of it. 133 In general, Total recognizes the controversy surrounding its presence
abroad, particularly in Myanmar, while stressing the difficult political context in which
oil corporations usually operate. On its corporate webpage, Total states: “Unfortunately,

123

Marianne Lavelle, The Court of Foreign Affairs: U.S. Corporations Face a Slew of Lawsuits Alleging
Human-Rights Abuses, U.S.NEWS, June 15, 2003, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/030623/23suits.htm.
124
DEMEYERE , supra note 5, at 38, 78; HANSEN, supra note 5, at 19-20.
125
Belgium Reopens, supra note 6.
126
Precisely, French courts exercised jurisdiction under the principle of active nationality (i.e. the
perpetrator is a national of the adjudicating state). See A NTONIO CASSESE , INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
277 (2003).
127
Belgian law, however, puts an additional restriction on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Relying on jurisdictional prescriptions under the principle of “passive nationality,” Belgian law requires the
victim of the abuses either to be a Belgian national, have an effective, usual, and legal residential status in
Belgium for at least three years, or, since May 2006, have a recognized refugee status in Belgium.
DEMEYERE , supra note 5, at 57-58.
128
Belgium Reopens, supra note 6.
129
At the time when the case was lodged, private individuals could initiate criminal proceedings through
the mechanism of “constitution de partie civile.” DEMEYERE , supra note 5, at 38.
130
Belgium Reopens, supra note 6.
131
In 2003, the Belgian universal jurisdiction statute of 1993, and amended in 1999, was repealed and most
of the law’s substantial provisions were integrated into the Belgian Criminal Code. Thus, new arts. 136bis–
136octies were introduced in the Belgian Criminal Code incorporating genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes into the substantial scope of actionable crimes under Belgian law. See DEMEYERE , supra
note 5, at 21-24.
132
In 1999, a new art. 5 was introduced in the Belgian Criminal Code providing for criminal liability of
legal persons. See DEMEYERE , supra note 5, at 12-13. Belgian Criminal Code, art. 5, does not contain any
restrictions as to the crimes covered by its scope of application. Therefore, it is widely agreed that Belgian
Criminal Code, art. 5, also regulates criminal liability of legal persons, in particular corporations, for
international crimes committed abroad. Id. at 37-38. Of particular relevance with respect to criminal
liability of corporations is Belgian Criminal Code, art. 136ter point 3, which incriminates slavery as a crime
against humanity in accordance with Rome Statute, art. 7, ¶ 1(c). Id. at 22, 28.
133
Belgium Reopens, supra note 6.
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the world’s oil and gas reserves are not necessarily located in democracies, as a glance at
a map shows.”134
¶47
In the face of public critique of their relations with repressive governments, Total
has made human rights performance an integral part of its Corporate Social
Responsibility (“CSR”) policies, describing its effort to address the “critical issue of
human rights” in its business operations abroad as an effort to “reconcil[e] security [for
its employees and assets] and human rights”135 as well as to spur community
development. 136 Total has subscribed to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights and implemented a two-pronged policy to (1) conduct human rights training
sessions for its security staff, and to (2) “[f]ormaliz[e] relations between Total
subsidiaries and governments on security issues.”137 The difficult standing that oil
corporations have when operating in countries with repressive regimes has become patent
in the recent debate over political sanctions against the military regime in Myanmar. In
this context, home governments have urged MNCs -- and especially Total -- to freeze
their investments in Myanmar. 138 Total continues to operate in Myanmar arguing that
"[f]ar from solving Myanmar's problems, a forced withdrawal would only lead to our
replacement by other operators probably less committed to the ethical principles guiding
all our initiatives."139
3. Forced Displacement in Sudan
¶48

In 1998, Canadian oil corporation Talisman Energy Inc. (”Talisman”) acquired a
stake in a major oil project in Sudan. 140 On November 8, 2001, Talisman was charged
with complicity in crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed by
government forces contracted to secure local oil projects. 141 The plaintiffs claimed that
Talisman aided and abetted the forced displacement of non-Muslim Sudanese from its oil
extraction area in South Sudan, as well as the resultant extrajudicial killings, torture, rape,
and physical destruction of civilian homes. 142
¶49
In its defense, Talisman claimed that its management was unaware of the forced
displacement conducted in and close to their oil concession areas. 143 The District Court
for the Southern District of New York found that “the government was [in fact] heavily
engaged in providing security for the GNPOC [Greater Nile Petroleum Operating
Company Limited as the entity conducting operations on behalf of the Consortium
134

TOTAL S.A., TOTAL IN BURMA : THE YADANA PIPELINE PROJECT , available at http://burma.total.com/.
TOTAL S.A., SHARING OUR ENERGIES 2006: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 15 (2006),
available at http://www.total.com/static/en/medias/topic1606/Total_2006_CSR_en.pdf.
136
Id. at 24.
137
Id. at 15.
138
French Fm Kouchner: Oil Giant Total Would Not Be Spared from Possible Sanctions vs Myanmar,
HERALD TRIB. EUR., Oct. 2, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/02/europe/EU GEN-France-Total-Myanmar.php.
139
As Myanmar Cracks Down on Protesters, Oil Companies Keep up Controversial Ties, supra note 2
(quoting Jean-Francois Lassalle, vice-president of public affairs for Total Exploration & Production).
140
See Reg Manhas, Talisman in Sudan: Impacts of Divestment, GLOBAL COMPACT Q. (2007), available at
http://www.enewsbuilder.net/globalcompact/e_article000775162.cfm?x=b11.
141
See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639-40 (S.D.N.Y Sept.
12, 2006).
142
See id. at 665-66.
143
See HUM. RTS. W ATCH, SUDAN , OIL, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 36-38 (2003).
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members under their agreements with the government] concession.”144 In particular, the
court substantiated that Talisman worked on drafting guidelines for the Consortium’s
interaction with the military in terms of providing logistical support. 145 Even though the
court held that there was evidence “that Talisman was informed that Government forces
forcibly displaced civilian populations to create a buffer zone around oil development
sites,”146 the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on September
12, 2006, since the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence that Talisman
“performed any act that assisted the Government in its violations of international law.”147
¶50
With regard to Talisman’s decision to withstand public pressure to close its
operations in Sudan for a long time, a Senior Manager at Talisman explained that as an
indirect investor in the pipeline project, the corporation was able to continue its
“advocacy with the Government of Sudan for tolerance and the protection of human
rights” and be actively engaged in community development programs in the oil
concession areas. 148 Elaborating on the developments surrounding Talisman’s
withdrawal from Sudan, he recalls that public pressure peaked in 2001, when the U.S.
House of Representatives passed a version of the Sudan Peace Act that would have led to
the delisting of Talisman shares from the New York Stock Exchange. The final bill
adopted by Congress did not contain these sanctions; still, it provided the backdrop
against which Talisman announced in October 2002 the sale of its interest in the
project. 149
4. Alleged Human Rights Violations in the Mining Industries
¶51

Companies in the mining sector have also frequently been accused of complicity in
human rights violations against local communities committed by private or public
security forces. For example, such accusations have been brought against Barrick Gold
in Papua New Guinea 150 and AngloGold Ashanti in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 151
¶52
Rio Tinto also faced intense public and judicial scrutiny for human rights
violations that occurred in connection with security operations surrounding its mine on
the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. 152 Rio Tinto allegedly requested
government support to suppress the uprising of local residents protesting against
environmental damage caused by Rio Tinto’s mining operations, as well as against its
racially discriminatory hiring practices. 153 The military intervention, the plaintiffs
claimed, unleashed secessionist efforts, an ensuing civil war and finally a military
144

Presbyterian Church, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 649. In its examination of the facts, the court stressed that the
admissibility of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs had not yet been evaluated and witnesses had not
yet been brought forward by plaintiffs. Id. at 642.
145
The guidelines stipulated that communication facilities of the Consortium should be made available to
the military, and accommodation and medical care should be provided. Id. at 649-50.
146
Id. at 670-71.
147
Id. at 679.
148
Manhas, supra note 140.
149
See id.
150
DAVID M ARTINEZ, CORP W ATCH, BARRICK’S DIRTY SECRET : M INING IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (2006).
151
See HUM. RTS. W ATCH, THE CURSE OF GOLD: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (2005).
152
See CORP W ATCH , A SSOCIATING WITH THE W RONG COMPANY: RIO TINTO'S RECORD AND THE GLOBAL
COMPACT , July 13, 2001, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=623; see also Sarei v. Rio
Tinto Plc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
153
See id. at 1121-26.
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blockade that lasted for several years and cut island inhabitants off from medical and
other supplies from the mainland. 154 A lawsuit was filed in U.S. courts against Rio Tinto
Limited, an Australian corporation, and Rio Tinto Plc., a company incorporated under the
laws of England and Wales, for crimes against humanity and war crimes. 155 In 2002, the
District Court for the Central District of California confirmed U.S. courts as the legal
forum of the dispute, 156 but dismissed all claims against Rio Tinto on the basis of the
political question doctrine. 157 In 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
ruling since the District Court erred in holding that the claims raised non-justiciable
political questions. 158
¶53
The case of Rio Tinto shows a mutual interdependence, with MNCs relying on the
government’s support to launch and maintain their business operations, and the
government relying on MNCs for the profit. Such intertwined private-public interests
entangle MNCs in highly complex political situations that may give rise to corporate
liability, liability that used to apply primarily to state actors.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS IN A BUSINESS CONTEXT : THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
¶54

Human rights problems faced by manufacturing industries differ significantly from
those faced by the extractive industries. Whereas human rights violations in the
extractive sector stem primarily from excessive acts under corporate security
arrangements, those in the manufacturing sector occur mainly within the supply chain
and infringe labor standards in the workplace. Accordingly, this section argues that the
corporate structures of MNCs in the manufacturing industries, particularly the textile
sector, are decisive in determining whether MNCs may be held responsible and liable for
human rights violations of their supplier factories.
¶55
The following section will briefly unfold patterns of human rights abuses in
supplier facilities, and discuss the liability risks that MNCs might encounter for these
violations. For this purpose, this section will first focus on the case study of Nike and
then proceed to illustrate the findings in other manufacturing sector cases.
A. Corporate Structures
¶56

Many companies in the manufacturing sector are called upon to take responsibility
for sweatshop working conditions in their subcontracted supplier factories, especially in
154

Id. at 1124-27.
Id. at 1120.
156
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds in favor of an
Australian forum. See id. at 1175. In order for a dismissal to be granted, defendants must show that (1)
there exists an adequate alternative forum, where they are amenable to process and the subject matter of the
suit is cognizable, and that (2) private and public interests favor trial in the alternative forum. Id. at 116465. The court dismissed the defendants’ motion holding that the “plaintiffs’ claims are not cognizable in
Australia. Id. at 1177-78.
157
Id. at 1198. According to the political question doctrine, a claim that presents a political question is not
justiciable. The doctrine has its roots in the principle of separation of powers and intends to ensure that the
judiciary is not interfering with decisions constitutionally committed to one of the other branches of
government. See id. at 1193-95. In Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court defined the factors that a court has to
consider in order to determine whether a claim involves a political question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
158
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, Plc., 487 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007).
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the sports apparel and footwear industries. These industries rely heavily on a so-called
“triangle” manufacturing system, which entails the outsourcing of labor- intensive
products to subcontracted companies in newly industrialized, low-wage countries. 159
Inherent in this business strategy is a formal detachment of the parent companies from
their subcontractors, which are incorporated as independent legal entities; this formal
detachment served as the basis of the positions adopted by many MNCs in the early
1990s vis-à-vis charges of human rights violations in subcontracted factories and enabled
MNCs -- particularly in the textile sector -- to displace blame onto its subcontractors who
were mainly located in Asia and Central America. 160
¶57
In response to alleged poor working conditions Nike took this “detachment
defense” when it declared: “We don’t make shoes.”161 This position was technically true,
as Nike had adopted the widely used outsourcing strategy, and the violations were
committed by legally independent subcontracted companies, not by the corporation’s
own managers or their plants. 162
¶58
An anti-sweatshop movement has sharply criticized the working conditions in
subcontracted companies overseas. The movement’s principal target has been Nike,
being the largest company in the global sports shoe and apparel industry. 163 However,
Nike’s major competitors, Reebok and Adidas-Salomons, have also faced similar
criticism for production practices in supplier factories. 164
B. The Case of Nike
¶59

The allegation that conditions in Nike’s supplier factories violate core labor
standards and human rights has become emblematic of the problems facing the
manufacturing, and especially the textile, industries overall. Therefore, this section
explores patterns of human rights abuses in supplier facilities and potential liability risks
by analyzing primarily, but not exclusively, the case of Nike.
1. An Account of Sweatshop Working Conditions

¶60

NGOs and other stakeholder groups have vigorously criticized Nike for the
sweatshop working conditions in its subcontracted supplier factories, particularly in
Indonesia, but also in Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan and other countries. These groups
allege that workers in supplier factories are paid legal minimum levels that are below
living wage levels and thus do not provide for the basic needs of the workers and their
families. 165 NGOs also claim that overtime work -- though voluntary according to
contract provisions -- has coercive features in the daily practice of these companies;
refusal to work overtime is often followed by intimidation, harassment or threat of

159

Graham Knight & Josh Greenberg, Promotionalism and Subpolitics, 15 M GMT . COMM . Q. 541, 543
(2002).
160
See id. at 558.
161
See Richard McIntyre, Are Workers Rights Human Rights and Would It Matter If They Were? 6 HUM.
RTS. & HUM. W ELFARE 1, 1 (2006).
162
See Knight, supra note 159, at 558.
163
See TIM CONNOR, GLOBAL EXCHANGE : STILL W AITING FOR NIKE TO DO IT (2001).
164
Knight, supra note 159, at 543.
165
CONNOR, supra note 163, at 4, 52.
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dismissal. 166 Moreover, non-compliance with national and international health and safety
standards in the contracting factories threaten the health and life of workers (e.g.
inadequate workers’ protective equipment in production lines, or high level exposure to
toxic chemical vapors and substances). 167 It is also claimed that worker intimidation and
harassment were common practices in contracted factories, and intended to interfere with
workers’ freedom of association, in particular their union involvement and strike
participation. 168 Nike recognized most of these deficiencies in its first Corporate
Responsibility (“CR”) Report published in 2001. 169
2. The Range of Liability Risks
¶61

Even though infringements of workers’ rights clearly touch on human rights related
issues, whether and to what extent workers’ rights can be classified as human rights is
debatable and not yet settled. 170 Regardless of such classification, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain held that violations of a “narrow class of international
norms” are actionable under the ATS. 171 In contrast, European jurisdictions apply mostly
international criminal law categories of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide in human rights litigation in their domestic courts. 172 Therefore, in both
instances, the liability risks of MNCs before domestic courts are restricted to a narrow set
of gross violations of international law.
¶62
Thus, leaving aside the discussion of whether workers’ rights are human rights,
courts are most likely to consider violations of core labor standards, 173 particularly the use
of child labor and forced labor, as falling into a narrow realm of these statutes. 174 In fact,
a lawsuit was brought before the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
against Nestlé, Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) for aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS and the TVPA. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were
liable for abuses by the ir agents, employees, partners, and otherwise contracted farms. 175
In particular, the three native Malian plaintiffs claimed that they were trafficked and
166

TIMOTHY CONNOR, W E A RE NOT MACHINES: INDONESIAN NIKE AND A DIDAS W ORKERS 19 (Clean
Clothes Campaign et al. eds., 2002).
167
CONNOR, supra note 163, at 4; CONNOR, supra note 166, at 24.
168
Id. at 11.
169
NIKE INC., FY01 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2001), available at
http://www.nikeresponsibility.com/#crreport/fy01_cr_report.
170
See McIntyre, supra note 161, at 9; Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor Standards:
The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 203, 231-32 (2004).
171
See Maassarani, supra note 65, at 46; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
172
DEMEYERE , supra note 5, at 21-24.
173
The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up adopted in 1998
(henceforth: 1998 Declaration) incorporates the core labor conventions which are considered to be
obligatory for all ILO members. As enumerated by the 1998 Declaration, the fundamental rights enshrined
in the core labor conventions include: freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; the effective abolition of
child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO, 86th Sess. (1998), available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename=D
ECLARATIONTEXT.
174
See Pagnattaro, supra note 170, at 211.
175
See Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Doe v. Nestle S.A., No. 05-5133, slip
op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2005).
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forced to labor in Cote d’Ivoire cocoa plantations; furthermore they claimed that they
were subjected to torture while working on the cocoa plantations. 176 However, to date, no
court has ruled on forced child labor as a cause of action under the ATS.
¶63
Even though some authors claim that all core labor standards can be enforced under
the ATS, 177 courts have only scarcely regarded the freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining, as well as the elimination of discrimination, as a cause of action
under the ATS. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, a prominent scholar in the field, refers to one
case where the court considered the rights to associate and organize as actionable under
the ATS inasmuch as the rights “are generally recognized as principles of international
law.”178
¶64
Apart from child labor and forced labor, other gross human rights violations that
occur in the sphere of the workplace of supplier facilities -- such as human trafficking,
torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment -- may be considered to fall in the
narrow realm of “violations of the law of nations,” as defined in Sosa and the
international crime categories under European jurisdiction statutes. Thus, a lawsuit filed
before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Nestlé for
alleged complicity in the murder of a trade union leader by the Columbian paramilitary
forces could hold promise in the future. 179 However, the substantial scope under these
statutes needs yet to be defined further by domestic courts.
3. Allegations of Child Labor
¶65

The most severe allegation that Nike has faced since the mid-1990s concerns the
employment of children by its contracting companies. In 1996, Life magazine first
reported that children as young as ten years old were manufacturing Nike products in
Pakistan. 180 In fact, in its 2001 CR report, Nike itself acknowledged that the “worst
experience and biggest mistake was in Pakistan, where we blew it” and that “[o]f all the
issues facing Nike in workplace standards, child labor is the most vexing.”181 Nike
further recalled the revelations documented in the 1996 Life magazine article, which
branded Nike as a “child labor company.” According to its 2001 CR report, Nike had
ordered hand-stitched soccer balls from the city of Sialkot and realized soon thereafter
that production was to be carried out through village contractors that employed
children. 182
¶66
Subsequently, Nike “reversed course” and subcontracted its production to a single
company that guaranteed minimum age standards for employment. 183 However, Nike has
176

Id. at 1.
See, e.g., Pagnattaro, supra note 170, at 231.
178
Rodriguez v. Estate of Drummond, 256 F.3d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Pagnattaro, supra note 170, at 24344.
179
See INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FORUM, ILRF SUES NESTLÉ FOR COMPLICITY IN COLUMBIAN UNION
M URDER, October 26, 2006, http://www.laborrights.org/end-violence-against-trade-unions/colombia/968.
180
See Steve Boggan, 'We Blew It': Nike Admits to Mistakes over Child Labor, THE INDEPENDENT , Oct. 20,
2001, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/1020-01.htm; Sydney H. Schanberg, On the
Playgrounds of America, Every Kid’s Goal is to Score: In Pakistan, Where Children Stitch Soccer Balls for
Six Cents an Hours, the Goal is to Survive, LIFE M AG. 38-48 (June 1996).
181
See NIKE, supra note 169, at 29.
182
Id.
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Id.
177

347

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2008

faced practical problems in implementing Nike’s prescribed minimum age standards of
eighteen years old for footwear manufacturing and sixteen years old for apparel and
equipment; for example, verifying the real age of applicants due to the lack of reliable
birth records has been particularly difficult in Pakistan and Cambodia. 184 Despite these
difficulties, Nike holds itself accountable for compliance with minimum age standards
and devotes itself to guarantee improved compliance with minimum standards. 185
¶67
Particularly public scrutiny of the incidents in Pakistan changed Nike’s approach
from avoidance and denial towards acknowledgement of and engagement with the
problem. On May 12, 1998, Philip Knight, CEO and Founder of Nike Inc., appeared at
the National Press Club in Washington, DC, where he laid out six commitments to
improving working conditions in Nike’s supplier factories. 186 Subsequently, Nike
initiated steps to ensure an independent monitoring system of its contractors. Along with
other corporations, Nike joined the Fair Labor Association (“FLA”), incorporated by
President Clinton in 1999 as a cooperation of apparel and footwear companies and
NGOs. FLA aims to create a monitory system that ensures corporate compliance with its
labor standards. 187 But Nike’s most significant reform -- which has had a tremendous
impact on other companies in the textile sector -- was its disclosure of its subcontracted
factories (nearly 800 in number). 188 As the first major apparel manufacturer that
voluntarily opened its entire supply-chain to independent monitoring and external
assessment, Nike has thus set an important precedent for the entire apparel and footwear
industry.
4. The Role of Public Security Forces
¶68

Local supplier companies often request and employ government forces in order to
provide security for factories, especially during times of unrest. Even though physical
violence is only occasionally reported, these security forces still serve to intimidate and
deter workers from exercising their freedom of association. 189
¶69
The employment of government forces is not the only consequence of the
interdependence between the state and corporations. Representatives of trade unions
have also been arrested and detained by government forces, often under vague charges. 190
In such cases, corporations may be charged with beneficial complicity based on a blurred
private-public divide and the mutual interest in profit that complicates the attribution of
responsibility for human rights violations.

184

Id.
Richard M. Locke, a prominent scholar in the field, argues that the Nike case “symbolizes both the
benefits and the risks inherent in globalization” and illustrates Nike’s development towards becoming a
Corporate Global Citizen. Richard M. Locke, The Promise and Perils of Globalization: The Case of Nike,
in M ANAGEMENT : INVENTING AND DELIVERING IT ’S FUTURE , 39, 39 (Richard Schmalensee & Thomas A.
Kochan eds., 2003).
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See CONNOR, supra note 163, at 1-2.
187
See NIKE, supra note 169, at 54-55; Fair Labor Ass’n, FLA History,
http://www.fairlabor.org/about/history (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).
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See McIntyre, supra note 161, at 2.
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See CONNOR, supra note 166, at 27.
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C. Beyond Nike: MNCs’ Responsibility for Human Rights Performance of Supplier
Factories
¶70

While receiving the most public attention, Nike is not the only case of human rights
violations in the supplier facilities of MNCs. Several MNCs have been charged with a
variety of human rights violations associated with their manufacturing supply-chains.
1. Health and Safety in the Workplace

¶71

MNCs have been scrutinized for low health and safety standards in overseas
supplier factories that jeopardize the health and lives of workers. For example, a major
fire that broke out on May 10, 1993 in the four-story factory complex of the Kader
Industrial Toy Company near Bangkok illustrates the magnitude of the problem. The
Kader Industrial Toy Company was a supplier to major corporations such as J.C. Penney
and Fisher-Price. 191 With 188 workers killed and 469 seriously injured, the fire was
referred to as the “worst industrial fire in history” to date.192 The safety precautions were
wholly insufficient as there were no fire extinguishers, alarms, or emergency exits, and
external exits were blocked. With flammable fabrics everywhere, the fire spread
quickly. 193
2. Human Trafficking

¶72

One of the largest human trafficking cases in the recent past involved the
Daewoosa apparel factory in American Samoa, which had entered into a contract with an
intermediate supplier to J.C. Penney, a U.S. department store. U.S. Attorney General
John Ashcroft described the working conditions in the Daewoosa factory as “modern day
slavery.”194 Instead of hiring locals, the owner of the factory imported workers from
Vietnam and China. Upon arrival in American Samoa, it was reported that Daewoosa
paid only a fraction of what was promised while charging excessive fees for room and
board. Payment was suspended if the factory ran out of orders, but charges for
accommodation and board continued to be deducted from the workers’ salaries. An
investigation by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration found “inhuman
living conditions,” including deprivation of food, high temperatures in the factory, and
overcrowded dorms. 195 Allegedly, food was withheld as a form of punishment. 196
191

Dep’t of Commc’n & Pub. Info., ILO, Business with a Conscience: Why Best Practice Is Good Practice,
57 W ORLD OF W ORK M AG. (2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/wow/Articles/lang-en/WCMS_081378/index.htm; Bob Herbert, In America; The Sweatshop Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1994,
available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE2DE153BF93BA15751C1A962958260.
192
Bob Herbert, In America; Terror in Toyland, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1994, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9903E0D61038F932A15751C1A962958260.
193
See Jill Murray, ILO, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Labour Standards,
http://www.itcilo.it/actrav/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/jill.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2007); Dep’t
of Commc’n & Pub. Info., ILO, supra note 191.
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John Gittelsohn, U.S. Sends Strong Message to Those Who Traffic in Human Lives, 8 GLOBAL I SSUES,
14, 14 (2003), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0603/ijge/ijge0603.pdf.
195
Id. at 15.
196
Steven Greenhouse, Beatings and Other Abuses Cited at Samoan Apparel Plant That Supplied U.S.
Retailers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2001, available at
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Furthermore, it was reported that the workers’ passports were confiscated to prevent them
from fleeing the factory.
¶73
Eventually, the U.S. Justice Department stepped in and the factory owner was put
on trial before a federal court in Honolulu. In 2002, he was convicted of holding the
workers in “involuntary servitude.”197 J.C. Penney reacted promptly after it had taken
notice of the conditions in the Daewoosa factory. According to Tim Lyons, a spokesman
for J.C. Penney, the company stopped selling apparel produced in the Daewoosa factory
and suspended its contracts with the supplier that was receiving its goods from there.
Furthermore, J.C. Penney claimed it was unaware that its supplier obtained products from
the Daewoosa factory. 198
3. Forced Child Labor
¶74

The chocolate industry has long been subject to public scrutiny for allegations of
forced child labor on their suppliers’ cocoa farms in West Africa, especially in the Ivory
Coast. A 2001 BBC article brought the issue to public attention, reporting that many
parents sold their children to work in the cocoa plantations where they “have to work so
hard they get sick and some even die.”199 Subsequently, the International Labour Office
(“ILO”) investigated 1500 farms across West Africa and found children working twelve
hours per day and using machetes that exposed them to a high risk of injuries. According
to the ILO, two-thirds of the children were under fourteen years old and most did not
attend school. 200
¶75
Nestlé and other chocolate corporations have faced increased criticism for buying
cocoa from plantations that allegedly employ forced child labor. As a result, on its
corporate webpage, Nestlé makes clear that it “does not own cocoa farms or plantations
in West Africa, nor [does it] employ workers on farms” but that it is nevertheless
committed to ensuring that child labor is not used on cocoa plantations. 201
¶76
Nestlé’s approach marks a potential new corporate human rights policy that steers
away from denying responsibility on formal grounds (along the lines of Nike’s former
“detachment defense”) and moves towards acknowledging and assuming responsibility
for actions of business partners. In fact, the problem of child labor in cocoa cultivation
has received great attention by the chocolate and cocoa industry. In a joint statement
with various stakeholder groups, the global cocoa and chocolate industry restated the
urgent need to put an end to “the worst forms of child labor [1] and forced labour [2] in
ws/U.S./U.S.%20States,%20Territories%20and%20Possessions/American%20Samoa.
197
Gittelsohn, supra note 194, at 16.
198
U.S. Firms Linked to Samoan 'Sweatshop' in Labor Report, CNN, Feb. 7, 2001, available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/fyi/news/02/07/samoan.sweatshops/index.html.
199
Humphrey Hawksley, Mali's Children in Chocolate Slavery, BBC, Apr. 12, 2001, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1272522.stm.
200
See Amnesty International UK, West Africa: Chocolate - Amnesty International Expresses Alarm at
Continuing Child Labour in Cocoa Industry, Apr. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=17323. These findings were confirmed by a recent
BBC article, as well as by Amnesty International. Humphrey Hawksley, Child Cocoa Workers Still
'Exploited', BBC, News April 2, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6517695.stm (last visited
January 18, 2008).
201
Nestlé UK Ltd., Cocoa Working Practices,
http://www.nestle.co.uk/OurResponsibility/DevelopingWorldIssues/Cocoa+Working+Practices.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2008).
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cocoa cultivation and processing in West Africa” and reaffirmed its commitment to this
end. 202 In 2002, the global cocoa and chocolate industry established the International
Cocoa Initiative, a multi-stakeholder foundation “working towards responsible labor
standards for cocoa growing.”203
IV. CONCLUSIONS
¶77

This analysis of human rights abuses for which MNCs are being scrutinized for
responsibility reveals eight discernable tendencies. First, there is increasing sensitivity to
human rights issues on the part of MNCs. This is reflected in the various multistakeholder initiatives to which MNCs have subscribed in the last several decades, such
as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the International Cocoa
Initiative. However, even though many MNCs have created social and economic
development programs, they continue to distance themselves from responsibility for the
concrete human rights abuses at issue, as evidenced by the various suits against MNCs
for human rights violations in numerous jurisdictions around the world.
¶78
Second, most cases demonstrate MNCs’ tendency to shift from formalistic denial to
acknowledgment of their responsibility for abuses committed by government forces and
subcontracted factories. Thus, rather than rebuffing calls for responsibility and arguing
that subcontracted supplier factories are not legally owned or operated by Nike, for
example, MNCs have begun to accept responsibility for labor and human rights
violations in these factories. 204 This trend shows that MNCs are prepared to enter into a
dialogue with the various stakeholder groups and discuss possibilities to prevent future
human rights abuses in relation with their business operations.
¶79
Third, it is difficult to allocate responsibility for human rights abuses since the
abuses are often linked both to business operations and the political and economic
situation in the host country. The situation becomes more complex where corporate and
governmental interests are closely intertwined, as is the case in oil extracting countries
where the industry is often nationalized and cond ucted as private-public joint ventures. 205
Thus, the distinction between governmental and corporate responsibilities becomes
blurred.
¶80
Fourth, extractive industries show the following pattern with regard to human right
problems: human rights abuses are often committed by government security forces or
government authorities of the host country, leaving the corporation to face complicity
charges for gross violations of human rights that qualify as international crimes. 206 Thus,
202

Nestlé UK Ltd., International Alliance Joins Forces to Address Child Labour Abuse in the West African
Cocoa Sector, Dec. 2001,
http://www.nestle.co.uk/OurResponsibility/DevelopingWorldIssues/International+Alliance+on+Cocoa.htm
.
203
Nestlé UK Ltd., International Cocoa Initiative, July 2002,
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204
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FOREIGN AFF. 7, 7 (1998).
205
See Boele, supra note 13, at 75.
206
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on their supplier cocoa plantations. See CLAPHAM , supra note 43, at 223-24. Another example of labor-
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the responsibility of oil and mining corporations for human rights abuses is closely
related to the political context in the host country and depends primarily on the relation
with the host government as regards the business and security operations.
¶81
Fifth, the human rights problems within manufacturing industries abroad mostly
involve allegations of abuse within the corporate production and supply chain, and
mostly pertain to the situation in the workplace. In many cases, abuses amount to
infringements of International Labor Standards. Also, as in the extractive industries,
manufacturing industries face complicity charges in abuses by government forces or
paramilitary groups; however in the manufacturing context, abuses usually occur as
infringements of the freedom of association and collective bargaining.
¶82
Sixth, the analysis has shown that the number of cases in domestic courts charging
MNCs for human rights violations in relation to business ventures has increased
significantly since the 1990s. However, most cases pending before domestic courts
involve gross violations of human rights, such as crimes against humanity, forced
displacement, summary execution, extrajudicial killing and torture, whereas
infringements of core labor standards have been primarily subject to corporate selfregulation207 rather than litigation. If brought before courts, labor-related ATS claims,
including infringements of core labor standards such as forced labor, child slavery and
abuse of trade unionists by security forces, could be found to constitute gross huma n
rights violations that satisfy the narrow category of “violations of the law of nations” that
are actionable under the ATS, as well as the specific set of international crimes that are
actionable under European universal jurisdiction statutes.
¶83
Seventh, the sector-specific patterns of human rights problems might translate into
a sectoral divide with regard to the extraterritorial adjudication of the abuses in domestic
courts. The divide might come to depend on the civil or criminal nature of the domestic
liability systems. Civil human rights litigation is a phenomenon peculiar to the U.S. 208
European jurisdictions, on the other hand, provide for criminal prosecution for direct
redress of international human rights violations. Thus, there is a divergence in civil and
criminal remedies for violations of international human rights norms. 209 This divergence
in remedies also implicates the causes that are actionable under the respective domestic
system. Whereas the ATS is quite vague and open in providing remedies for a “violation
of the law of nations” (28 U.S.C. § 1350), European statutes prescribe remedies for
human rights violations along the lines of the international law categories of crimes
against humanity, war crimes and genocide. The reason for the divergence is that many
related human rights problems in the extractive industries is the claim against Rio Tinto for racial
discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal of
the discrimination claim on act of state grounds. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc., 487 F.3d 1193, 1224 (9th Cir.
2007).
207
Corporate self-regulation is at the core of Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”); CSR can be defined
as “an extended form of [corporate] governance” under which a firm’s fiduciary duties are extended to all
stakeholders. Lorenzo Sacconi, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a Model of "Extended"
Corporate Governance: An Explanation Based on the Economic Theories of Social Contract, Reputation
and Reciprocal Conformism, 142 LIUC PAPERS IN ETHICS, LAW , AND ECON. 7-8 (2004).
208
See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 14-16 (2004).
Even though other jurisdictions, such as France and Belgium allow civil claims as adjunct to criminal
proceedings, they usually do not adjudicate a unique civil cause of action for human rights violations. See
DEMEYERE , supra note 5, at 49-50; HANSEN, supra note 5, at 22, 30.
209
See Olivier de Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European
Law, in NON-STATE A CTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 288; JOSEPH, supra note 207, at 13-14.
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of these European provisions were introduced in national codes as an implementation of
international treaties and conventions, in particular the Geneva Conventions and its
Additional Protocols. 210 Thus, redress is confined to abuses that qualify as international
crimes -- a risk to which the extractive industries are especially prone; whereas redress
for environmental damages and infringements of labor rights -- a risk to which the
manufacturing industries are prone -- are more difficult to prosecute under these legal
systems. 211 Despite the restrictive interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court, the ATS
still provides enough flexibility in its terms to potentially accommodate the latter cases in
the future. Thus, this civil/criminal divergence may translate in the future into a divide
among different industrial sectors with regard to liability risks, depending on the
respective legal system that can assert jurisdiction over MNCs.
¶84
Lastly, even though major human rights litigation against corporations has been
brought primarily under the U.S. ATS, European legal systems, like that of Belgium, are
well-equipped to hold corporations extraterritorially liable for violations of international
humanitarian law, and are thereby able to exercise jurisdiction over crimes that were
committed abroad by non-Belgians as well. However, liability litigation in this context is
confined to the category of international crimes provided by the Rome Statute.
¶85
In sum, despite the increased scrutiny of corporate practices, MNCs continue to
face liability risks in numerous sectors. As legal systems continue to evolve to
accommodate claims against MNCs for human rights violations, identifying common
problems and risk areas in major industries should serve to facilitate increased corporate
human rights compliance and responsible global corporate citizenship.

210

See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Universal Jurisdiction: Steps Forward, Steps Back , 17 LEIDEN J. INT ’L L. 375,
383 (2004).
211
This does not apply in cases in which infringement of labor rights do also qualify as international
crimes.
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